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“ENOUGH AND AS GOOD” IN THE INTELLECTUAL
COMMONS: A LOCKEAN THEORY OF COPYRIGHT AND
THE MERGER DOCTRINE
ABSTRACT
Embedded in our national identity, the right to reap the fruit of one’s labor
defines the quintessential American Dream. This ownership right seems so
intuitively obvious that it needs no logical explanation, and thus John Locke’s
foundational theory of property rights is often misinterpreted from the start.
Locke’s labor theory of acquisition has perpetuated a kind of philosophical
circuit split among scholars, relegating his ideas to a realm of partisan
politics. These misinterpretations are unfortunate because, when properly
applied, Locke’s property theory holds the promise of resolving complex issues
in copyright law and theory.
In the tradition of Locke’s contextualist interpreters, this Comment
examines Locke’s philosophy and its context with the aim of describing a
theory of Lockean copyright that is compatible with the basic tenets of
American copyright law. Because the Lockean copyright theory offered here
accounts for both procedural and consequential goods, it has stronger
prescriptive power than the current utilitarian model and can do more work.
Also, because Lockean duties lend well to bright-line rulemaking, applying
Lockean thinking to legal analysis can streamline litigation. As an example of
Locke’s cash value to copyright law, this Comment expounds upon his
thoughts on the natural law duties of property owners and the state’s role in
mitigating transaction costs of private ownership to assign burdens of proof at
trial. This framework is utilized to outline a potential solution to the circuit
split over whether the merger doctrine should apply during the
copyrightability stage or the infringement stage of a copyright infringement
lawsuit.
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Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases
belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be,
very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.
—Justice Joseph Story1

INTRODUCTION
Although the test for copyright infringement seems simple enough on
paper,2 Justice Story’s observation that intellectual property (IP) distinctions
approach “the metaphysics of the law”3 forecasted the storm of confusing
philosophical conjecture, internal contradictions, and circuit splits that plagues
copyright law today.4 Although copyright law is widely considered a statutory
creation, some scholars attribute this doctrinal confusion to the constitutionally
enshrined foundation of intellectual property law: utilitarianism.5
Unfortunately, the absolutely objective perspective required to carry out the
utilitarian balancing calculus of the Copyright Clause is not a position that
real-life judges can occupy.6
This Comment argues that applying John Locke’s theory of property rights
to copyright law can resolve much of the doctrinal mess. Rather than engage in
ad hoc balancing of the public welfare against private interests in a utilitarian
framework, Locke’s property theory—imposing rule-based duties on the
property owner at the outset of ownership—serves underlying utilitarian ends.7
1

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (emphasis added).
A claimant suing for copyright infringement must establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright
(referred to as the copyrightability stage) and (2) that the defendant actually copied protectable elements of
that work (referred to as the infringement stage). See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
387 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2004). “If no direct evidence of copying is available, a claimant may establish this
element by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the copyrighted work and
the allegedly copied work are substantially similar,” to which the defendant may raise various affirmative
defenses. See id.
3 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
4 Summing up academia’s discontent for the ineptitude of contemporary copyright law, one scholar calls
copyright law “‘a swollen barnacle-encrusted collection of incomprehensible prose’ and ‘an obese
Frankensteinian monster.’” Terry Hart, Copyright Reform Step Zero, 19 INFO. & COMMC’NS TECH. L., 147, 148
(2010) (citation omitted). Esteemed Professor David Nimmer has described Title 17 (the Copyright Act) as
consisting of “interminable pages of opaque, contradictory, and indecipherable regulations.” David Nimmer,
Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1315 (2004).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–3
(2011).
6 See MERGES, supra note 5, at 3.
7 See id. at 7.
2
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This Comment explores how Locke’s rigid structure of prima facie rights and
duties can be utilized to allocate burdens of proof and streamline copyright
infringement litigation proceedings.8
Beyond matters of efficiency, Locke’s property theory is useful in
contemporary IP discussions because it embodies normative judgments that
substantially contributed to the first copyright law ever enacted, from which all
American copyright law originated.9 Locke’s concerns with monopolies and
societal progress undoubtedly shaped early copyright theory and should still
serve as guiding principles today.10
This Comment’s aim is to define a theory of Lockean copyright from a
perspective of reconciliation, considering Locke’s compatibility with basic
tenets of American copyright law as a starting point. This approach avoids
making broad-sweeping claims that call for paradigmatic shifts in copyright
jurisprudence, instead focusing on how piecemeal application of Lockean
theory can solve real problems in the law.11 To further demonstrate Locke’s
pragmatic value within copyright law, this Comment applies Locke’s theory to
the longstanding circuit split over whether the merger doctrine (barring
copyright protection for an expression that effectively confers a monopoly over
an idea12) should be applied at the initial copyrightability stage or the later
infringement stage of a copyright infringement suit.13
This Comment proceeds in Part I by describing Locke’s labor theory of
acquisition as well as its historical significance and various interpretations. Part
II follows with a brief examination of Locke’s political advocacy against the
renewal of the Licensing Act of 1662 as contextual evidence of his perspective
on intellectual property. Part III draws on the ideas of other contextualist
Lockean copyright theorists to describe a system of Lockean copyright that is
compatible with the Copyright Clause and § 102 of the Copyright Act. This
Part concludes with a rebuttal to Adam Moore’s interpretation of Lockean
copyright theory.
8

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part II.
10 See Justin Hughes, Locke’s 1694 Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copyright Historiographies),
27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 555, 556–57 (2010) (introductory essay).
11 Contrast this approach with the one taken by Adam Moore’s article, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual
Property. See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 108
(1997) (advocating paradigmatic changes in U.S. copyright law to comport with his reading of Locke).
12 See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967).
13 See infra Part IV.A.
9
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To demonstrate the practical utility of the Lockean copyright theory
advocated by Part III, Part IV explores how that theory is capable of resolving
the tedious circuit split concerning the merger doctrine. Part IV argues that the
merger doctrine should be split into separate inquiries that take place at
different stages of the infringement suit.14 Locke’s rumination on the state of
nature and the formation of the social compact provides a foundation to assess
the state’s role in alleviating high transaction costs on property owners.15
Locke’s goal of minimizing transaction costs justifies placing simple legal
disputes, like instances of merger where there is only one possible way to
express an idea, at pretrial dismissal stage. These issues can be deduced from
simple logic such that an actor in the state of nature could self-adjudicate.16
However, more complex legal issues, like instances of merger where there is a
finite set of potential expressions available to express an idea, require a
complete examination of the trial record to make a sound determination; this
kind of complex property dispute was the primary reason inhabitants in the
state of nature formed the social compact and empowered judges.17 As
explained in Part IV, the Lockean theory of merger proposed here would
always impact copyrightability, causing either complete reversion to the public
domain or a diminution of the scope of copyright protection.18
I. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF LOCKE’S PROPERTY THEORY AND ITS
RELEVANCE
In order to best understand John Locke’s theory of property rights, it is
paramount to examine the tumultuous political climate in which it was
conceived. Around 1680, religious sectarianism dominated English politics;
Locke was closely entangled in this conflict through his employer, Lord
Shaftesbury, who introduced the Exclusion Bill that sought to prevent King
Charles II’s Catholic brother, James II, from ascending to the throne.19 After
14

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
16 See infra Part IV.C.1.
17 See id.
18 See infra Part IV.C.
19 See GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY 15–17 (1995); John Locke,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). Although Lord
Shaftesbury commanded a majority in the House of Commons, the Bill was repeatedly blocked by Charles II’s
control over the House of Lords; this event is known as the Exclusionary Crisis, a watershed moment in British
history that marked the decline in the monarch’s authority. See JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN
LOCKE 44 (1969) (“As the struggle progressed it became increasingly a struggle to establish permanent
controls over the prerogative for the Whigs . . . .”).
15
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Charles II uncovered an assassination plot on his life concocted by several of
Locke’s acquaintances, Locke feared for his life and fled to Holland, where he
stayed until the Glorious Revolution saw an end to the absolute monarchy in
1688.20
To combat negative sentiments toward the crown in the years preceding the
Glorious Revolution, Tory loyalists utilized Sir Robert Filmer’s moral
apologia, Patriarcha, to assert that the landed gentry’s continued wealth
depended on maintaining the King’s authority.21 Relying on Scripture, Filmer
argues that God created the entire world and gave it to one man, Adam.22 Over
the course of human history, Adam’s private dominion was partitioned by
various kings who retained Adam’s paternal jurisdiction, empowering them to
allocate property based on a system of feudal entitlement.23 According to
Filmer, maintaining exclusive ownership would be impossible without the
centralized power of a monarch because to exclude others from land claimed
as property, the property owner would require consent from all humans on
Earth.24 Thus, Filmer surmised that any title to property is both morally and
practically contingent on the monarchy’s divine authority and power.
Appealing to Lord Shaftesbury’s political constituents, who later organized
as the Whig faction and advocated for constitutional restraints on the
monarch’s authority, John Locke argues in the Second Treatise of Government
that one’s color of title to property can be discerned independent of royal
decree.25 Like his rival, Locke begins his analysis of private property with a
biblical account of the time prior to civilization, which he calls the state of
nature; however, Locke devises a way that individuals so situated could
acquire property rights without requiring direct consent from anyone.26

20 See Ellis Sandoz, The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors, 34 J.
POLITICS 2, 12–13 (1972); John Locke, supra note 19.
21 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1563 & n.171 (1993).
22 See id.; E. Clinton Gardner, John Locke: Justice and the Social Compact, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 347,
351–52 (1992).
23 See Gardner, supra note 22, at 351–52.
24 SREENIVASAN, supra note 19, at 25.
25 See id. at 16–18.
26 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980)
(1690) [hereinafter SECOND TREATISE] (“If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved,
notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.”).
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A. The Labor Theory of Acquisition and Its Major Interpretations
Contesting Filmer’s biblical interpretation, Locke argues that God
originally bequeathed the world to all of humanity to be shared in common.27
While resources in the state of nature are held in common, individuals retain
property in themselves and their labor.28 In what would later be called the labor
theory of appropriation, Locke argues, “Whatsoever then he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with,
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”29
This move allows Locke to avert Filmer’s consent problem by demonstrating
that the unilateral act of mixing one’s labor with raw materials held in common
invokes a natural right to the fruit of one’s labor, establishing private
ownership.30
Importantly, this ability to unilaterally acquire private property in the state
of nature is not unlimited; rather, Locke maintains that property owners must
obey natural law obligations, ordained by God in Psalms and Timothy.31 The
foremost proviso that limits private ownership is the duty to preserve “enough,
and as good, left in common for others” (hereinafter the “enough and as good”
proviso).32 Meeting this duty is a condition precedent to initial acquisition and
a condition subsequent to continued ownership, so that any later violation may
cause reversion of the property to the natural commons.33 Again relying on
Scripture, Locke proclaims that “[n]othing was made by God for man to spoil
or destroy” (hereinafter the spoilage restriction), indicating that property
owners have an obligation to prevent their property from going to waste.34
Although this Comment explores various interpretations of Locke’s
theories throughout, the fundamental schism among Locke scholars—the
interpretation of the limiting provisos after the formation of civil
government—merits attention here.

27

Id. at 18 (citing Psalms 115:16).
Id. at 19.
29 Id.
30 See SREENIVASAN, supra note 19, at 17–18.
31 See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 18–21.
32 Id. at 19.
33 See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 165 (1980)
(“[W]hen the vital proviso is no longer satisfied, goods once legitimately acquired can no longer be retained in
exclusive possession, but revert to common ownership.”).
34 See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 20–21.
28
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The possessive individualist interpretation, championed by C.B.
Macpherson,35 proposes that once civil society is established, the limiting
provisos are necessarily expunged.36 The spoilage restriction is nullified
through the creation of money, “some lasting thing that men might keep
without spoiling.”37 Macpherson highlights Locke’s phrase that one “might
heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased” without breaking the
spoilage restriction.38 Macpherson interprets this passage as a justification for
unrestricted accumulation of wealth.39 Furthermore, the “enough and as good”
proviso is “transcended,” according to Macpherson’s interpretation, by
highlighting Locke’s passage:
[H]e who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen,
but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving
to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed [sic]
and cultivated land, are . . . ten times more than those which are
yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness laying waste in
common.40

According to Macpherson’s reading, privately owned land necessarily yields
more product than land held in common.41 This surplus value derived from
industrious effort will eventually trickle down to the rest of society, thereby
always leaving “enough and as good” for others.42 Macpherson’s
interpretation, which embraces the so-called “traditional reading” of Locke,
has been used by conservative and libertarian pundits to advocate for laissezfaire capitalism, an unregulated wage system, vast accumulation of wealth, and
trickle-down economics.43

35 C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 3
(1962). According to Macpherson, possessive individualism is a “conception of the individual as essentially
the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.” Id. This reading of Locke
advocates a minimal state in which “[p]olitical society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this
property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.” Id.
36 Id. at 203–20.
37 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 28.
38 Id.; see MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 204.
39 MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 221.
40 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 23; see MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 211–12.
41 See MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 211.
42 See id. at 212.
43 See Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not to Be Excluded—or the
Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS COMMC’NS
& ENT. L.J. 265, 274 (2000). Some may find this ironic because Macpherson, a theoretical proponent of
socialism, uses the possessive individualist interpretation of the Second Treatise in order to criticize American
capitalism. See MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 1–4.
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By examining Locke’s entire body of work in its historical and political
context, contextualist Lockean scholars have argued that the so-called
“traditional view” is skewed towards excessive liberty and individualism.44
Contextualist Lockeans like James Tully argue that the limiting provisos are
not so easily expunged merely through civil society’s inventions of money,
wages, and the privatization of resources.45 Rather, private individuals and
civil government must take active roles to expunge the perpetual natural law
limitations and promote the public welfare.46 This interpretation argues that an
individual’s right to property varies based on environmental constraints and the
needs of others.47 The contrast between contextualists’ emphasis on Lockean
relational duties and possessive individualists’ emphasis on Lockean individual
liberty is the basis of decades of disagreement and debate over Locke’s
foundational property theory.
B. Significance of Locke’s Philosophy in American Law
Throughout American jurisprudential history, the writings of John Locke
have enjoyed an elevated stature.48 Justice Story described this prolific
philosopher and statesperson as “the most strenuous asserter of liberty” whose
vision of democracy had a lasting impact on American law.49 Locke’s labor
44

TULLY, supra note 33, at 61.
Id.
46 Id. (describing Lockean ownership as a stewardship relationship). The role of Locke’s limiting
provisos in the state of nature and in civil government after formation of the social compact is analyzed in
greater detail below. See infra Part IV.C.1.
47 Id. at 11 (“[A] fundamental assumption of Locke’s political thought is, contrary to common
misunderstandings, not to treat man as an isolated individual but, rather, to treat him in his various relations
with other men and with God.”).
48 The Supreme Court has continually evoked Lockean rhetoric and theory in deciding a diverse array of
cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2753 (2011) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SOME
THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (1962), in 37 ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 27–28 (C.W. Elliot ed., 1910)) (discussing child development and parental duties);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative
autonomy and separation of powers); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 860 n.10 (1987)
(acknowledging Locke’s labor theory of acquisition as a means of creating moral entitlement to the fruit of
one’s labor); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 278 (1961) (discussing Locke’s right to revolution).
Locke’s ubiquity even extends to the Bluebook, which references his Second Treatise as an example of how to
cite “Pre-1900 works.” THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 15.4(c), at 141 (Columbia Law
Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015). Scholars have remarked on Justice Scalia’s notable use of Lockean
theory. See JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: A HAMILTONIAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT 127 (2006) (“One detects from Scalia’s reading of Article II a strong hint of John Locke’s
right of prerogative.”).
49 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 299 n.2 (photo.
reprint 1970) (1833).
45
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theory of acquisition profoundly influenced the Founders and is embedded
deep within the Constitution.50 Thomas Jefferson kept no secrets concerning
the importance of Locke’s philosophy in the formation of his own political
beliefs and morals.51 In one letter, Jefferson wrote, “Whenever there is in any
country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of
property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is
given as a common stock for man to labour and live on.”52 In the essay
Property, James Madison echoed the teachings of Locke by defining
property’s broader and more just meaning that “embraces every thing to which
a man may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every one else
the like advantage.”53
C. Locke’s Gloss of History
Locke’s special situation as the “father of American liberalism”54 has its
drawbacks. Lockean rhetoric has been used as a language of legitimation for
ideologies foreign to Locke himself. This gloss of history has created
ambiguity, offering a “hermeneutical free play” for partisan theorists to make
strategic appeals by paying lip service to Locke’s great works in order to
advance their own political agendas.55
Lockean historians have often turned to changing cultural values to explain
the hermeneutics of Locke’s property theory.56 In The Liberal Tradition in
50 See ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 90 (1948). Furthermore, it is apparent that in writing the Declaration of Independence,
“Jefferson had . . . succeeded admirably in condensing Locke’s fundamental argument into a few hundred
words.” Id.
51 See Kenneth D. Stern, John Locke and the Declaration of Independence, 15 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV.
186, 190–91 (1966); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull (Feb. 15, 1789), reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 561 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958) (“Bacon, Locke and Newton . . . I
consider . . . as the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception, and as having laid the
foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and Moral sciences . . . .”).
52 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 51, at 681, 682 (1953).
53 James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). Compare id., with SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26,
at 19 (discussing the “enough and as good” proviso).
54 Michael Alexander, Censorship and the Limits of Liberalism, 47 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 58, 78
(1989).
55 PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 44 (1996).
56 See, e.g., James L. Huston, The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of Aristocracy, and
the American Concept of the Distribution of Wealth, 1765–1900, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 1079, 1080 (1993)
(describing how the Lockean labor theory of value was fueled by “Protestantism’s stress on reward being
earned by the sweat of one’s brow”).
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America, Louis Hartz claims that specific historical events, unique to the
American experience, shaped our interpretation of Locke’s labor theory of
acquisition.57 Hartz argues that settlement of the western frontier instilled a
new sense of negative freedom among brave prospectors, “living in the world’s
closest approximation to a [Lockean] state of nature.”58 This shared experience
imparted a sentiment of rugged individualism in the American collective
conscious and caused subsequent theorists to emphasize vulgar interpretations
of Locke’s labor theory of acquisition that ignore or trivialize the communal
duties imposed by property ownership.59 These interpretations are sometimes
pejoratively labeled “irrational Lockeanism” for their strict adherence to
libertarian maxims of laissez-faire capitalism and unrestricted accumulation of
wealth despite substantial evidence that Locke did not envision this.60 Critics
argue that these opportunistic libertarian theorists misrepresent Locke’s theory
by cherry-picking quotes from Chapter V of Locke’s Second Treatise and
considering them in a theoretical and historical vacuum.61
Today, Locke’s property theory has been propagandized and misconstrued
to the public, reducing the great philosopher to a placard for the libertarian
brand. For example, consider the John Locke Foundation, a conservative
501(c)(3) think tank promoting radically limited government,62 funded in part
by the billionaire Koch brothers.63 It’s no coincidence that individuals with
inordinate wealth promote this skewed interpretation of Lockean property
rights, which all but eliminates any duties property owners might owe to other
members of civil society.

57 LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 74–75 (1955).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 60 (“One side of Locke became virtually the whole of him.”).
60 See id. at 6 (describing the possessive individualist interpretation held by Macpherson and Moore as “a
nationalist articulation of Locke which usually does not know that Locke himself is involved”).
61 See Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean
Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 48 (2002) (“If we situate this theory within the context and
purpose for which it was undertaken, it is not entirely clear that Locke drew the libertarian conclusion
attributed to him.”).
62 About the John Locke Foundation, JOHN LOCKE FOUND., http://www.johnlocke.org/about (last visited
Feb. 24, 2016).
63 Koch Family Foundations, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Koch_Family_
Foundations (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). The Kochs have a distinct pecuniary interest in preventing
government regulations and market-based solutions that address the tragedy of the commons because “the very
essence of the Koch business model is to exploit breakdowns in the free market.” Tim Dickinson, Inside the
Koch Brothers’ Toxic Empire, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
inside-the-koch-brothers-toxic-empire-20140924.
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II. NO INTERPRETATION NEEDED: LOCKE’S POLITICAL ADVOCACY FOR
AUTHORIAL RIGHTS AS A PRECURSOR TO MODERN COPYRIGHT LAW
To avoid creating yet another pseudo-Lockean theory, this Part examines
Locke’s political writings in their historical context to determine if and how
Locke’s property theory should apply to copyright law.64
Around 1695, Locke formed the “College,” a club that included himself,
Member of Parliament Edward Clarke, and prominent surgeon and social
advocate John Freke.65 This club advocated legislation in Parliament and
lobbied to defeat the renewal of the Licensing Act of 1662.66 The Act limited
printing and regulated the ability to own a printing press; Locke was most
concerned with the monopoly granted by the English monarch to the Stationers
Company to enforce exorbitant licensing fees.67 In February of 1695, Edward
Clarke was appointed by the House of Commons to a committee charged with
drafting a bill to replace the Licensing Act.68
Locke’s “Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662” presents both
economic and social problems caused by the Stationers Company’s monopoly
on printing.69 Most apparent to Locke was the high cost and “scandalously ill”
quality of ancient texts, which the Stationers Company owned the exclusive

64

Such a contextualist interpretative tool rests on the assumption that Locke would not intentionally
contradict himself when comparing his philosophical works with his acts of political advocacy. See M.
SELIGER, THE LIBERAL POLITICS OF JOHN LOCKE 33 (1968) (Locke’s works appear contradictory unless
understood in their historical context.). See generally JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS (1993) (defining the canon of contextualist interpretations of Locke). This
contextualist assumption will not surprise many jurists because it is heavily used in many well-recognized
textual canons of construction. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Tanner Lecture on Human Values 111
(Mar. 8–9, 1995) (transcript available at the University of Utah), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/ato-z/s/scalia97.pdf (“In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us
not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow
interpretation—though not, of course, an interpretation that the language will not bear.”).
65 Benjamin Rand, Introduction to THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND EDWARD CLARKE 1, 40–
41 (Benjamin Rand ed., 1927) [hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE].
66 See id. See generally Mark Goldie, Introduction to John Locke, Liberty of the Press, in LOCKE:
POLITICAL ESSAYS (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) [hereinafter Locke, Liberty].
67 See Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891, 898
(2006). In a letter to Clarke, Locke bemoaned personal troubles with the Stationers Company; it refused to
grant him a license to publish an English primer of Aesop’s Fables. See Letter from John Locke to Edward
Clarke (Jan. 2, 1692), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 65, at 366, 366–67.
68 Goldie, supra note 66, at 329 (introductory text preceding Locke’s Liberty of the Press).
69 Hughes, supra note 10, at 556.
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right to print.70 On a societal level, Locke was concerned with the chilling
effect the Licensing Act had on authors’ abilities to create derivative works,
inhibiting communal knowledge and progress.71
In opposition to the Licensing Act, Locke supported authorial rights as a
means of expanding knowledge. Locke argues, “I know not why a man should
not have liberty to print whatever he would speak.”72 According to Locke, this
broad liberty to publish should be buttressed by strong rights of attribution held
by prior authors.73 Authorial rights should not be granted in perpetuity, as
Locke explains “it may be reasonable to limit their property to a certain
number of years after the death of the author, or the first printing of the book,
as, suppose, fifty or seventy years.”74
Although the College was unsuccessful in passing its proposed bill,
Locke’s rhetoric of societal progress and advocacy for term limits on exclusive
printing rights found their way into the Statute of Anne, the first-ever copyright
act.75 Under the Statute of Anne, authors of new works received fourteen years
of copyright protection, with a renewal term of an additional fourteen years.76
It is well-recognized that the Statute of Anne had a major impact on American
copyright law and the formation of our current Copyright Act.77 Because of
Locke’s influence on the Statute of Anne, his thoughts on authorial rights are
regarded as compatible with underlying rationales in the American paradigm
of intellectual property.78

70 John Locke, Anno 14° car. 2. cap. XXXIII, in PETER KING, 1 THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 375, 378
(Thommes Press 1991) (1830) [hereinafter Locke, Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662].
71 See id. at 386 (arguing that granting an exclusive right to print ancient texts is “unreasonable and
injurious to learning”).
72 Id. at 376; see also Zemer, supra note 67, at 900.
73 Locke, Liberty, supra note 66, at 338 (amendments to draft bill). To protect original authors, Locke
sought to prohibit any book to be printed, published, or sold without the printer’s or bookseller’s name, under
great penalties. Id.
74 Locke, Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662, supra note 70, at 387.
75 See Zemer, supra note 67, at 900 n.31. There is evidence that Locke’s writings influenced passage of
the Statute of Anne; Clarke distributed copies of Locke’s Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662 to other
members of Parliament. See Raymond Astbury, The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and Its Lapse in
1695, 33 LIBR. 296, 305 (1978), http://library.oxfordjournals.org/content/s5-XXXIII/4/296.accessible-long.
76 See Statute of Anne 1709, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).
77 See Lyman Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223,
223 (1966).
78 See Astbury, supra note 75, at 313; Zemer, supra note 67, at 904.
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Numerous scholars have argued that Locke’s ruminations on authorial
rights are compatible with his labor theory of acquisition.79 Locke’s
Memorandum on the Licensing Act provides textual support for the
proposition that the product of an author’s mental labor is her property,80 to
which she has a natural right.81 Locke’s interest in creating a limited copyright
term that promotes a robust public domain resonates well with the contextualist
emphasis on the social duties imposed by Locke’s limiting provisos.82
Using Locke’s real-world political advocacy as a starting point to frame a
Lockean theory of copyright that is compatible with contemporary copyright
law, the next Part examines Locke’s theoretical writings to determine how a
Lockean theory of copyright would function.
III. A LOCKEAN THEORY OF COPYRIGHT THAT IS COMPATIBLE WITH
AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
Applying Locke’s labor theory of acquisition to issues in copyright law has
been an alluring prospect for IP theorists over the years.83 As a preliminary
matter, all Lockean copyright theorists must assess the scope of Locke’s
definition of property to determine whether it may include ineffable, intangible
goods, such as copyrights.84 Fortunately, one need not extrapolate his theory to
arrive at Locke’s belief in a broad conception of property.
In the Second Treatise, Locke makes explicit that his definition of property
includes more than tangible res; the foremost property owned by each

79

See, e.g., Zemer, supra note 67, at 908.
Locke, Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662, supra note 70, at 386 (criticizing the Licensing
Acts as “so manifest an invasion of the trade, liberty, and property” (emphasis added)). Locke’s proposed
amendments to the draft Bill clarify its purpose as “[t]o secure the author’s property.” Locke, Liberty, supra
note 66, at 338.
81 Cf. Locke, Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662, supra note 70, at 380 (“[N]or can there be any
reason in nature why I might not print them as well as the Company of Stationers, if I thought fit.”).
82 Id. (“[S]uch titles as these, which lie dormant, and hinder others, many good books come quite to be
lost.”). Locke’s rhetoric seems congruent with the “enough and as good” proviso and the spoilage restriction.
Compare id., with supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 61, at 3; Moore, supra note 11, at 108; Zemer, supra note 67, at 928;
Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112
YALE L.J. 1179, 1179 (2003).
84 The Supreme Court seems receptive to a broad theory of Lockean property. See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (discussing trade secrets as a kind of intangible property akin to
Lockean “labour and invention” (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 405 (1768))).
80
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individual is in her personhood, her rights, and her labor.85 This broad
conception of property strongly influenced the Founders and the
Constitution.86 Locke posits that the natural property right of self-ownership
enables one to acquire property:
[T]hough the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by
being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the
actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of
property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to
the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had
improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not
belong in common to others.87

The often-overlooked language of “invention and arts” in this passage may
lend textual support to the proposition that Locke contemplated copyright and
patent protection within his labor theory of acquisition.88 Thus, if Locke’s
labor theory of acquisition can support a laborer’s claim to intellectual
property, then his theory must also be interpreted to prevent appropriation of
intellectual objects that violate the “enough and as good” proviso and the
spoilage restriction.89
What would such a Lockean copyright theory look like? In answering this
question, this Comment attempts to reconcile a Lockean theory of copyright
with existing fundamental copyright doctrines in constitutional law in Part
III.A and in statutory law in Part III.B. This project is a pragmatic and

85 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 90 (“By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to
mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.”); see also Morgan Cloud, Expressive
Property in a Digital Age, in INFORMATION AND LAW IN TRANSITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH, THE INTERNET,
PRIVACY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 55, 58 (Anna-Sara Lind et al. eds., 2015) (“The broad
conception of property was a cornerstone of Locke’s complex theories about the nature of human beings,
individual rights, society, and government.”).
86 See Madison, supra note 53, at 266 (“[A] man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them. . . . He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the
objects on which to employ them.”); see also Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1404 (7th Cir. 1988)
(quoting SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 46) (“In contrast to Hume, a distinguished philosophical
expositor of Blackstone's narrow conception, Locke, whose thinking influenced the framers of the
Constitution, defined “property” as “life, liberty, and estate.”).
87 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 27; see also United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801, 810 (8th
Cir. 1992) (discussing Locke’s broad theory of property).
88 Cf. Steven J. Horowitz, Rethinking Lockean Copyright and Fair Use, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 209, 222
(2005).
89 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1581 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 319 (1988).
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piecemeal one and, as Part III.C argues, does not require a paradigmatic shift
in focus from widely accepted copyright doctrines.90
A. Reconciling Locke with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”91
When drafting copyright legislation, the Copyright Clause demands that
Congress strike “an appropriate legal balance between the rights of authors and
publishers on one hand and the rights of users and consumers on the other.”92
By securing ownership rights to self-authored expressions for a limited
duration, copyrights function as economic incentives in the furtherance of the
constitutional goal of promoting the progress of the arts and sciences.93
Allowing a perpetual monopoly to be upheld via copyright law contradicts this
constitutional purpose.94
At first glance, it may seem that Locke’s property theory, based on natural
rights, is fundamentally at odds with the commonly held, consequentialist
reading of the Copyright Clause.95 However, the consequentialist aim of
promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts” demanded by the
Copyright Clause can be achieved without strict adherence to utilitarian
theory.96 Many scholars recognize that Locke’s labor theory of acquisition

90

But see Moore, supra note 11, at 108 (arguing that paradigmatic shifts in United States copyright law
are required to bring about a Lockean theory of copyright).
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
92 Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1992, at 3, 3.
93 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
94 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“[C]opyright
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work. . . . It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and
art.”).
95 Cf. Craig, supra note 61, at 43 (arguing that libertarian interpretations of Lockean copyright are
expressly contrary to consequentialism in the Copyright Clause). See generally H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility
and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828 (1979) (arguing that the different emphases between utility and rights
make their respective paradigms incompatible).
96 See Kenneth Einar Himma, Toward a Lockean Moral Justification of Legal Protection of Intellectual
Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1105, 1119 (2012). Himma argues that
there is no assumption in the Constitution that any consequentialist theory is true. First, although
this provision grants Congress the power to protect copyright for reasons having to do with the
consequences and social benefits, the Constitution, strictly speaking, provides the legal
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contains “a buried utilitarian assumption” that makes his theory reconcilable
with constitutional copyright law.97 Locke’s limiting provisos impose continual
duties that mitigate the negative externalities of one’s property entitlement,
establishing utilitarian considerations in his natural rights framework.98
B. Reconciling Locke with § 102 of the Copyright Act
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act provides protection for “original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” while § 102(b)
states that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”99 In the landmark
decision Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court described what would later be
called the “idea–expression dichotomy,” dictated by the language of
§ 102(b).100 In Baker, the claimant alleged infringement of a system of
bookkeeping described in his copyrighted book.101 Justice Bradley, writing for
a unanimous Supreme Court, indicated that although the complainant owned a
copyright in his authored work, he did not own the ideas expressed in that
work, arguing that “[t]o give to the author of the book an exclusive property in
justification for protecting copyright. It does not so much as even purport to provide a moral
justification.
....
. . . For this reason, the very system of law that the Constitution defines is in need of the
foundational moral justification.
Id.

97

ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 63 (1987). Tom G. Palmer describes how these “buried assumptions” in
Locke’s natural law correspond with utilitarianism:
Such “buried assumptions” concern human flourishing or the attainment of man’s natural end.
These consequences are usually attained indirectly, through respect for general rights, or rules of
conduct, rather than directly, as in most utilitarian theories. The sharp separation in contemporary
moral philosophy between natural rights and utility, or the common good, is, however, an
artificial one, and would certainly be foreign to many of the great natural law theorists.
Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?: The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 819 n.5 (1990); cf. Emir Aly Crowne, The Utilitarian Fruits
Approach to Justifying Patentable Subject Matter, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 753, 755 (2011)
(describing a Lockean theory of patents as a means of achieving a utilitarian result).
98 See Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
713, 733–34 (1989).
99 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
100 See 101 U.S. 99, 102–05 (1880).
101 Id. at 99–100.
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the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been
officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.”102 The
system of bookkeeping was not eligible subject matter for copyright
protection.103
Numerous scholars have taken a contextualist approach to reconcile
Locke’s property theory with the idea–expression dichotomy.104 Their central
argument is that any appropriation of an idea is a per se violation of the
“enough and as good” proviso.105 Therefore, ideas cannot be appropriated and
must remain held in common for free use by all of humanity.106
In his seminal essay, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Professor
Justin Hughes draws the analogy between the “field of all possible ideas” and
the Lockean commons.107 Like the commons, which Locke describes as “that
which God gave to mankind in common,”108 Hughes makes the theoretical leap
towards a seemingly platonic proposition: ideas exist a priori as creations of
God to be held in common.109 Hughes notes,
[I]n that view, the ideas already exist and the chief labor is
transporting them from the ethereal reaches of the idea world to the
real world where humanity can use them. If ideas are thought of as
such preexistent platonic forms, the only activity possible is
execution, which consists of transporting, translating, and
communicating the idea into a form and a location in which humans
have access to it.110

102

Id. at 102.
Id. at 107. “Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common property of the
whole world, any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own way.” Id. at
100–01.
104 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 89, at 1581; Hughes, supra note 89, at 315.
105 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 89, at 1581(“The proviso prohibits a creator from owning abstract ideas
because such ownership harms later creators. The more general an idea is, the more capable it would be of
rediscovery by others. To give ownership in such fundamentals would deprive future creators of a meaningful
opportunity otherwise open to them.”).
106 See id.
107 Hughes, supra note 89, at 315 (“[I]deas fit Locke’s notion of a ‘common’ better than does physical
property. The ‘field’ of all possible ideas prior to the formation of property rights is more similar to Locke’s
common than is the unclaimed wilderness.”).
108 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 18.
109 Hughes, supra note 89, at 315 (“It requires some leap of faith to say that ideas come from a ‘common’
in the Lockean sense of the word. Yet it does not take an unrehabilitated Platonist to think that the ‘field of
ideas’ bears a great similarity to a common.”).
110 Id. at 312.
103
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In this interpretation of Locke, the labor required to create intellectual property
acts to “transport” intellectual objects from a theoretical realm into
particularized expressions that are subject to ownership.111 This theory of
“propertizing” intellectual objects by laboring to create an expression from an
uncopyrightable idea fits nicely with the fixation requirement of § 102(a).112
On this view, fixation is necessary evidence that human labor has transformed
an abstract idea into a copyrightable expression.113 Like Tully posits for real
property, Hughes argues that if an otherwise valid copyright violates the
“enough and as good” proviso, then the owner’s exclusive right is
“depropertized” and either reverts to the commons entirely or is limited in
scope.114
Some scholars find contention with such a reading of Lockean copyright
because it requires a platonic view of ideas as existing prior to human
discovery.115 Besides its theoretical weightiness, the platonic view of ideas
discussed by Hughes is not analogous to the Lockean commons. Locke
describes the commons as wild and uncultivated,116 while Hughes’s
interpretation posits that all ideas are already cultivated in the platonic realm of
forms.117
Horowitz secularizes Hughes’s project by arguing that the intellectual
commons “consists of the resources for the production of intellectual products
111

Id.
Compare id., with 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating that in order to invoke copyright protection for an
original work of authorship, it must be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
113 See Hughes, supra note 89, at 312.
114 Compare id. at 319, with TULLY, supra note 33, at 165. Many theorists point to §§ 37–38 of the
Second Treatise to support this claim. See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 23–25. However, the strongest
textual support for Hughes’s depropertization-reversion theory can be found in the opening pages of Locke’s A
Letter Concerning Toleration, which states that
112

[i]f anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the
preservation of [private property], his presumption is to be check’d [sic] by the fear of
Punishment, consisting of the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests or goods, which
otherwise he might and ought to enjoy.
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (James Tully ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1690)
(emphasis added); cf. Zemer, supra note 67, at 935 (“It is clear that a natural right for Locke is a dynamic
rather than static guarantee, changing to meet the needs of the particular situation.”).
115 See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 88, at 222. Even Hughes realizes that a platonic understanding of ideas
“may be reification in the extreme.” Hughes, supra note 89, at 312.
116 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 21 (noting, however, that “it cannot be supposed [God] meant it
should always remain common and uncultivated,” so long as acquisitions from the commons satisfy the
limiting provisos).
117 Horowitz, supra note 88, at 222; see Hughes, supra note 89, at 312.

NORTHOVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

5/27/2016 10:17 AM

“ENOUGH AND AS GOOD” IN THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS

1381

and not the products themselves.”118 Horowitz argues that ideas are raw
materials in the intellectual commons that serve as building blocks for ownable
expressions. Ideas are communal resources akin to large bodies of water and
the atmosphere, which necessarily must be kept in common; these precious
communal resources are per se unownable.119 This interpretation squares
nicely with the idea–expression dichotomy; ideas are essential communal
resources, and preserving their free flow is necessary to sustain a healthy
democracy.120 But when ideas are mixed with the intellectual labor of an
author in the act of original authorship, that particular expression becomes
subject to private ownership,121 so long as the limiting provisos remain
unviolated.122
The proposition that ideas are communal resources that should not be
privately owned is supported by Locke’s arguments in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding.123 Here Locke argues that humans acquire knowledge
in one of three ways: (1) observation of phenomenon in the world, (2)
categorization of new actions or abstract concepts, and (3) invention.124 Locke
describes invention as “voluntary putting together of several simple Ideas in
our own Minds: So he that first invented Printing, or Etching, had an Idea of it
in his Mind, before it ever existed.”125 This implies that some simple,
preexisting ideas must be utilized in order to “invent” an idea capable of
expression.126 Once this particular idea is formed, the author’s labor transfers
the particular idea into a fixed, tangible form subject to copyright protection.127
118

Horowitz, supra note 88, at 222.
See id. In Some Considerations of the Consequences of Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of
Money, Locke implies that some natural resources, such as air and water, should never be completely
appropriated. JOHN LOCKE, SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOWERING OF INTEREST,
AND RAISING THE VALUE OF MONEY, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1, 41 (C. Baldwin ed., London 1824)
(1691) (“What more useful or necessary things are there to the being, or well being of men, than air and
water? . . . Hence it is, that the best and most useful things are commonly the cheapest: because, though their
consumption be great, yet the bounty of providence has made their production large, and suitable to it.”).
120 See Horowitz, supra note 88, at 222.
121 See id. (“The ideas that inspire the production of intellectual products are commonly owned, whereas
the individual expressions—the particular poem, painting, or song—are not part of the natural intellectual
common.”).
122 See id.
123 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 291–93 (Peter H. Nidditch ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING].
124 Id. at 291–92.
125 Id. at 292.
126 See Zemer, supra note 67, at 938 (“Only the combination of pre-existing ideas and templates makes a
person the first inventor.”).
127 See Hughes, supra note 89, at 319.
119
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At this point, it is possible to fully conceive the Lockean theory of
copyright law that this Comment advocates. An author who creates an original
work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression has a prima facie
property claim in that intellectual object, which will be granted copyright
protection unless ownership of that intellectual object violates one of the
limiting provisos.128 Subsequent violations of the “enough and as good”
proviso cause “depropertization” of the copyright and reversion to the public
domain or diminution of the scope of copyright protection.129 As other
contextualists have argued, this Comment posits that the limiting provisos
create two kinds of duties: (1) duties at the onset of property acquisition and
(2) continual duties that extend over the course of continued ownership.130 In
the copyright context, both kinds of duties must be met to justify acquisition
and continued ownership of a particular expression.131
While this Lockean theory of copyright does not immediately solve all the
dilemmas in copyright law, it does create a general normative framework to
advance discussions in copyright law.132 Because of the complexity of the
idea–expression dichotomy, Horowitz admits that some hard cases may need
further consideration.133 The remainder of this Comment will attempt to apply
this reading of Lockean copyright to one such hard case that is currently
debated among the circuit courts: the merger doctrine.
C. A Rebuttal to Moore’s Lockean Copyright Theory
This Comment is not alone in addressing the merger doctrine in light of a
Lockean theory of copyright.134 In opposition to the stance recommended by
this Comment, Adam Moore argues that the merger doctrine should be
128
129
130
131
132
133

See, e.g., Moore, supra note 11, at 78.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See Horowitz, supra note 88, at 216.
See id. at 223.
As Horowitz explains,
Sometimes it might be hard to tell the extent to which an intellectual product is actually an
expression rather than merely an idea. For example, consider a musician who records a single
note—with nothing distinct about it—on the piano. The note itself is part of the intellectual
common: it is a raw material that, combined with other materials, musicians use to create unique
expressions. But at the same time, this particular musician used this note alone to express herself.
The idea/expression dichotomy seems to blur.

Id. Without explicitly indicating so, Horowitz’s hypothetical dilemma implicates the issue of merger in current
copyright law. See infra Part IV.A.
134 See Moore, supra note 11, at 92–93.
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abrogated under his reading of Lockean copyright theory.135 This Part argues
that Moore’s conclusion on the merger doctrine rests on false premises
concerning Lockean theory and the general nature of intellectual property.
Moore asserts that the Lockean labor theory of acquisition can account for
creation and ownership of intellectual property, limited prima facie by the
“enough and as good” proviso.136 While it is theoretically cumbersome to
determine what quantity of property constitutes “enough” and what quality of
property constitutes “as good” to satisfy the “enough and as good” proviso,137
Moore concludes by logical deduction that if acquisition harms no one but
benefits at least one person (a “Pareto improvement”), then the acquisition
necessarily passes the “enough and as good” proviso.138 Moore also believes
that many products of the mind are created “ex nihilo—from nothing.”139
Moore reasons that the appropriation of newly created products of the mind
never worsens anyone’s position because “the frontier of what is available for
appropriation is practically infinite.”140
Moore’s argument proceeds as follows: (1) Based on the unexamined
assumption that ex nihilo creation of ideas is possible, Moore asserts that the
field of ideas is practically infinite.141 (2) Because the field of ideas is
practically infinite, Moore reasons that private ownership of a newly created
idea will necessarily benefit the putative owner without causing harm to
anyone, resulting in a Pareto improvement.142 (3) Because Moore interprets the
“enough and as good” proviso as being necessarily expunged by making a
Pareto improvement, he concludes that the privatization of any idea is always
justified under his reading of Locke’s property theory.143 In a fundamental
departure from American copyright jurisprudence, Moore asserts that even
135

Id. at 93.
See id. at 78.
137 Other theorists argue that what constitutes “enough and as good” is determined by a baseline
consideration of what would have been available in the state of nature. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 180–81 (1974). But this approach leads to theoretical difficulties, particularly when
considering a Lockean theory of intellectual property. See Gordon, supra note 89, at 1559 n.149, 1581 n.237.
138 See Moore, supra note 11, at 78–79. Given an initial allocation of goods among a set of individuals, a
change to a different allocation that makes at least one individual better off without making any other
individual worse off is called a “Pareto improvement.” See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512–13 (1980). An allocation is defined as “Pareto optimal” when no
further Pareto improvements can be made. Id.
139 Moore, supra note 11, at 77.
140 See id.
141 Moore, supra note 11, at 77–78.
142 See id.
143 See id.
136
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appropriation of ideas is justified as the fruit of one’s mental labor, so long as
such ideas are not already in the public domain or “part of the common
culture.”144 Because ideas are copyrightable on Moore’s account, he sees no
use for the idea–expression dichotomy or merger doctrine, and concludes that
they should be abrogated under a Lockean theory of copyright.145
The contextualist reading of Locke’s labor theory of acquisition shows the
flaws in Moore’s reasoning.146 According to Locke, nothing can ever be
created ex nihilo by human labor alone, because only God is capable of pure
creation147:
The Dominion of Man . . . in the great World of visible things; . . .
however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to
compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but
can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter,
or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being.148

According to Locke, no measure of artistry or skill exerted by individual
industry could allow the human mind to create an idea ex nihilo.149 On
Hughes’ account, this passage bolsters the platonic concept of ideas as
preexisting forms.150
However, it is not necessary to adhere to a Lockean version of platonic
metaphysics in order to defeat Moore’s proposition that ideas can be created ex
nihilo through human effort alone, by appealing to Locke’s theory of mind
espoused in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.151 Locke believed
the human mind begins as a tabula rasa—blank slate—and must acquire all
ideas through a posteriori learning from the external world.152 Because no
ideas are innate to the human mind, any idea invented by human labor must
use the limited resource of preexisting, simpler ideas learned from observing

144

Id.
Moore, supra note 11, at 93. But see Zemer, supra note 67, at 934 (“It is wrong to portray Locke as a
defender of a robust system of natural property right, unencroachable by norms of equality and public good.”).
146 See supra Part III.B.
147 Zemer, supra note 67, at 937–38.
148 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 123, at 120.
149 See A. John Simmons, Makers’ Rights, 2 J. ETHICS 197, 200–01 (1998) (“God’s property is based on
his having created new things; man’s property is based on extending his property in his person by acts of labor,
which may or may not ‘make’ new things, but which never make them in a way sufficiently like God’s ex
nihilo creations . . . .”).
150 See Hughes, supra note 89, at 311–12.
151 See generally LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 123.
152 See id. at 104.
145
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nature and society.153 In light of this context, Moore’s reading of Lockean
copyright seems contradictory because his belief in ex nihilo creation of ideas
does not coincide with Locke’s epistemological theory.
Even if one overlooks this inconsistency, accepting Moore’s proposal that
the “frontier” of ideas is limitless,154 his argument remains flawed because it
assumes all ideas are “as good” as each other and therefore any appropriation
of a newly created idea is a Pareto improvement.155 Assuming arguendo that
ideas can be created ex nihilo such that there is an infinite supply of potential
ideas available for privatization, only a finite few of those ideas will be of any
value.156 Without any reference to other preexisting concepts, the so-called ex
nihilo idea would appear unintelligible to its listener.157 For Locke, the
invention of intelligible ideas requires individual intellectual labor that uses
preexisting, simple ideas that are culturally constructed.158 Agreeing on this
point, Professor Drahos argues,
[E]ven where the stock of abstract objects is infinite, the human
capacity to exploit that stock at any given moment is conditioned by
the state of cultural and scientific knowledge which exists at that
historical moment. . . . The set of usable abstract objects may also be
further reduced because some ideas or knowledge may be necessary
gateways to others.159

Moore’s copyright theory grants protection to newly created ideas because
he regards them as infinitely plentiful, thus any appropriation of them
necessarily leaves “enough” to satisfy the “enough and as good” proviso.160
However, because culture and technology define a limited set of valuable
ideas,161 Moore’s theory does not account for the “as good” in the “enough and
as good” proviso.162 If absolute ownership rights to newly created ideas were
153

See id. at 89–92.
Moore, supra note 11, at 77.
155 See id. at 77–79.
156 See Donald G. Richards, The Ideology of Intellectual Property Rights in the International Economy, 60
REV. SOC. ECON. 521, 530–31 (2002).
157 Cf. Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,
16 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 3, 9–10, 13 (2003) (claiming that the creation of intellectual property is a bilateral
act between individual and society).
158 See Horowitz, supra note 88, at 227 (quoting Gordon, supra note 105, at 1563–64).
159 DRAHOS, supra note 55, at 51.
160 See Moore, supra note 11, at 77–78.
161 See Richards, supra note 156, at 531 (arguing that ideas are more so a result of social construction
rather than individual creation).
162 See Horowitz, supra note 88, at 215–16 (discussing the qualitative meaning of “enough and as good”).
154

NORTHOVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

1386

5/27/2016 10:17 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1363

granted in perpetuity, as Moore advocates, some copyright owners would be
allowed to monopolize the limited set of culturally valuable and
technologically feasible ideas.163 Ultimately, Moore’s pseudo-Lockean
justification for the radical proposal of idea appropriation is only possible
because he neglects the qualitative demands of the “enough and as good”
proviso while erroneously assuming that the quantitative demands of the
proviso are met.
Upon review, Moore’s flawed conclusion that a Lockean copyright theory
would demand abrogation of the merger doctrine can be traced back to the
fundamental schism in Lockean interpretation, outlined in Part I.A. Like C.B.
Macpherson, Moore attempts to construct an interpretation of Chapter V of
The Second Treatise in a theoretical vacuum that is structured such that any
natural law duties dictated by the “enough and as good” proviso and spoilage
restriction are easily expunged. Macpherson presupposes that the surplus value
created by laissez-faire capitalism will necessarily leave “enough and as good”
for others,164 while Moore presupposes that an infinite stock of ideas will
necessarily leave “enough and as good” for others.165 By relying on these
unfounded assumptions masked by logical flourishes, Macpherson and Moore
downplay the role of the limiting provisos and emphasize an unencumbered
natural right to amass unlimited property, irrespective of the social cost.166 But
these interpretations do not comport with the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution or the Copyright Act and have stretched Locke’s own words to
their breaking point.
IV. MONOPOLIZING IDEAS: THE MERGER DOCTRINE AND LOCKE’S “ENOUGH
AND AS GOOD” PROVISO
This Comment advocates a contextualist Lockean theory of copyright as a
general normative framework capable of resolving many hard cases in
copyright law. This Part exemplifies the theory’s practical utility by applying it
to resolve the merger doctrine circuit split. Part IV.A describes some of the
most polarizing central cases from differing sides of the split. Rather than
provide an exhaustive description of case law, this Part highlights landmark
163

See id. at 216, 222–23. Drawing an analogy to tangible property further illustrates the absurdity of
Moore’s proposition: although there are theoretically infinite resources available in the universe, only a very
small percentage located on or near Earth is of any practical value to humans.
164 See MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 203–21.
165 See Moore, supra note 11, at 77–78.
166 See Zemer, supra note 67, at 926–29.
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decisions to derive the theoretical foundations of the merger doctrine
disagreement. Part IV.B advocates a pragmatic split-approach to the merger
doctrine, applying it to both stages of an infringement suit, but argues that a
finding of merger should always affect the copyrightability of the claimant’s
work and allow for actual copying by the defendant. Part IV.C explains how
the Lockean copyright theory advocated above could resolve the circuit split,
finding results that corroborate the legal recommendations in Part IV.B.
A. A Brief Description of the Circuit Split
To provide context for the analysis of the split, an overview of the general
structure of copyright infringement suits, as succinctly articulated by Lexmark
International v. Static Control Components,167 is appropriate here. To establish
a claim of copyright infringement, the claimant must show “(1) ownership of a
valid copyright” and “(2) that the defendant copied protectable elements of the
work”168:
The first prong [called the copyrightability stage] tests the originality
and non-functionality of the work, both of which are presumptively
established by the copyright registration. The second prong [called
the infringement stage] tests whether any copying occurred (a factual
matter) and whether the portions of the work copied were entitled to
copyright protection (a legal matter). If no direct evidence of copying
is available, a claimant may establish this element by showing that
the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the
copyrighted work and the allegedly copied work are substantially
similar.169

Once this prima facie burden is met, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
that one of the various affirmative defenses, like fair use, applies.170
Since its inception, copyright law has perplexed the various circuit courts
by its complicated and pedantic nature; at the forefront of this confusion is the
merger doctrine. The merger doctrine was first developed in two cases:
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian171 and Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co.172 In Kalpakian, the plaintiff brought an infringement suit over its
167

387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 534.
169 Id. (citations omitted).
170 See id.; see Nathan C. Rogers, Note, Copyright Protection: A Dead Fish for Sculptors of Taxidermy
Mannequins?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 159, 181 n.104 (1998).
171 446 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1971).
172 379 F.2d 675, 676 (1st Cir. 1967).
168
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“copyright registration of a pin in the shape of a bee[,] formed of gold[, and]
encrusted in jewels.”173 Judge Browning determined that the idea of a bee pin
and its expression “appear to be indistinguishable,” claiming that “[t]here is no
greater similarity between the pins of plaintiff and defendants than is inevitable
from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in both.”174 Ultimately, the court
ruled that because the idea and expression were inseparable, copying the
expression could not be barred because such a ruling “would confer a
monopoly of the ‘idea’”175
Similarly, the Morrissey court contemplated the copyright of a simple
sweepstakes involving the social security numbers of participants.176 The
Morrissey court determined that if a limited number of ways exist to express an
idea, then the expressions are not subject to copyright protection because
otherwise, “by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, [such a copyright holder]
could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.”177 Ultimately the
court sided with the defendant, concluding that the sweepstake rules were not
copyrightable subject matter “and plaintiff cannot complain even if his
particular [rules were] deliberately adopted.”178 These early cases did not
mention the term “merger” and left the definition and scope of the doctrine
ambiguous, allowing interpretive room for a circuit split to develop.
Arising from these early cases, the merger doctrine states that when an idea
is so closely linked to a particular expression that there is only one way or a
small number of ways to express the idea, the expression is said to have
merged with the idea.179 A merged expression is barred from copyright
protection because allowing such a copyright to exist would confer an unfair
monopoly to the idea itself, preventing subsequent expressions of that idea.180
Because this common law doctrine was never explicitly codified, some courts
have applied the merger doctrine to the initial question of whether the
claimant’s work is copyrightable, while others have applied it as an affirmative
defense to excuse a particular defendant’s conduct, leading to the circuit split
described below.
173

Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 739.
Id. at 742.
175 Id.
176 Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 676.
177 Id. at 678.
178 See id. at 679.
179 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir. 2004).
180 Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742).
174
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1. The Copyrightability Approach to the Merger Doctrine
With no clear common law decisions for support, many subsequent courts
turned to the statutory language and intent of § 102(b) of the Copyright Act,
focusing on the policy rationale of incentivizing economic growth by
permitting the free flow of ideas, to conclude that the merger doctrine should
be applied to the copyrightability stage.
In Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., a pipeline company
sued its competitor for copying maps outlining a proposed pipeline route.181
Both parties in this suit were negotiating government contracts to build
adjoining segments of the same pipeline.182 The defendant copied and utilized
maps submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by Kern River
when applying for permission to build a pipeline in the same corridor as Kern
River.183
Judge Clark, writing for the Fifth Circuit, indicated that although Kern
River’s map falls within the category of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works” eligible for copyright protection under § 102(a)(5) of the Copyright
Act, § 102(b) prohibits granting copyright protection to “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”184 The
Court recognized the congressional intent behind this statutory language as
striking a balance between “the competing concerns of providing incentive to
authors to create and of fostering competition in such creativity.”185 The Fifth
Circuit held that the idea of the proposed location of the pipeline and its
expression embodied on a map are inseparable and, via the merger doctrine,
not copyrightable.186 Judge Clark rejected the complainant’s argument that the
original creation of Kern River’s map was a costly venture: “[t]he problem for
the copyrightability of the resulting maps, however, is not a lack of originality,
but rather that the maps created express in the only effective way the idea of
the location of the pipeline.”187

181

Id. at 1459.
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1463 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
185 Id. (citing Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983)).
186 Id. at 1463–64.
187 Id. at 1464. Perhaps the nexus between the originality requirement and this instance of merger is
stronger than what Judge Clark contemplated. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:47,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015).
182
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The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its position on the merger doctrine in Veeck v.
Southern Building Code Congress International.188 In Veeck, the plaintiffappellee, Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI), a nonprofit
organization whose purpose was “to develop, promote, and promulgate model
building codes,” sued a website operator for infringing on its copyrighted
building codes, which had been enacted into law.189 Veeck, the operator of a
noncommercial website dedicated to sharing information around North Texas,
had difficulty finding the town copies of the building codes for two Texan
towns, and instead bought them in digital form from SBCCI.190 Despite the
copyright notice on the disk, Veeck copied and pasted the relevant building
codes from the disk to his website, without attribution to SBCCI, thus bringing
about an infringement lawsuit.191
Judge Jones indicated that because the accuracy of legal wording is crucial,
there is only one way to express the building codes as law; thus, the merger
doctrine renders that expression uncopyrightable.192 “[A]s law, the model
codes enter the public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder’s
exclusive prerogatives. As model codes, however, the organization’s works
retain their protected status.”193
More recently, the Seventh Circuit agreed that applying the merger doctrine
during the copyrightability stage is the best approach. In Ho v. Taflove,
Professor Ho brought an infringement suit against a faculty colleague for
copying his improved mathematical model for predicting electron behavior.194
Ho’s research assistant was tasked with converting the model into computer
code to be further analyzed; after five years of work with Ho, the research
assistant transferred to the defendant’s research team.195 The student retained
some of Ho’s unpublished manuscripts to which he had contributed.196 Two
years later, the defendant and the research assistant published articles
describing the model without attributing Ho.197 Ho filed a lawsuit after
learning of the alleged infringement when he attempted to submit his research
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

293 F.3d 791, 801 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 793–94.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 793–94.
See id. at 801 (“It should be obvious that for copyright purposes, laws are ‘facts’ . . . .”).
Id. at 793 (emphasis omitted).
See 648 F.3d 489, 493–94 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 493–94.
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for publication but was rejected because the ideas were preempted by the
defendant’s publication.198 Ho alleged that the defendant “copied the substance
of the equations, figures and text.”199
Judge Ripple held that the merger doctrine rendered Ho’s equations and
figures uncopyrightable because, as a mathematical model representing
scientific fact, there is only one way to accurately represent the underlying
idea.200 Because Ho did not meet the burden of showing that there was more
than one way to express the ideas underlying his model, Judge Ripple affirmed
the defendant’s grant of summary judgment.201 Because the substance of Ho’s
equations and figures were deemed uncopyrightable, any evidence of actual
copying that took place due to the research assistant’s possession of Ho’s
manuscript was irrelevant.202
2. The Affirmative Defense Approach to the Merger Doctrine
The Second and Ninth Circuits contend that the merger doctrine is most
appropriately applied as an affirmative defense in the infringement stage of
analysis. This approach is heavily advocated by Professor David Nimmer, a
prolific authority in copyright law.203 Addressing the circuit split, Nimmer
argues that the “better view” is to analyze “the inseparability of idea and
expression in the context of a particular dispute, rather than attempting to
disqualify certain expressions from protection per se.”204 Under this approach,
merger serves to excuse a finding of substantial similarity between two
independently authored expressions.205 Merger excuses the defendant’s
particular conduct under the circumstances but does not affect the scope of the
claimant’s copyright.206
198

Id. at 494.
Id. at 499.
200 See id. at 497; see also Coquico, Inc. v. Rodríguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The
merger doctrine denies copyright protection when creativity merges with reality; that is, when there is only one
way to express a particular idea.” (emphasis added)).
201 See Ho, 648 F.3d at 499–500.
202 See id. at 504. Such a plaintiff may find relief for actual copying under trade secret law, so long as the
intellectual object at issue remained unpublished and was intentionally kept secret; Ho could not meet this
burden. Id.
203 See David Nimmer, IRELL & MANELLA LLP, http://www.irell.com/professionals-51.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016).
204 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03 (2015) [hereinafter
NIMMER] (footnote omitted).
205 See id.
206 See id.
199
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Nimmer’s argument for merger as an affirmative defense is most
enthusiastically advocated in Kregos v. Associated Press.207 In Kregos, the
creator of a form that compiled statistics on baseball pitchers brought a
copyright infringement suit against a newspaper.208 Kregos had circulated his
form to various newspapers that subscribed to his service of compiled baseball
statistics.209 The year after Kregos began distributing his baseball statistics
form, Associated Press released a pitching form that was nearly identical to the
one owned by Kregos.210
Judge Newman concluded that the merger doctrine did not apply in this
case because Kregos’s baseball statistics form compiled facts based on matters
of taste and personal opinion, showing that other expressions existed that could
also be appropriated.211 In dicta, Judge Newman argued that “[a]ssessing
merger in the context of alleged infringement will normally provide a more
detailed and realistic basis for evaluating the claim that protection of
expression would inevitably accord protection to an idea.”212 Rather than focus
on the language and intent of § 102(b), the Kregos opinion focused on the
practicality of judicial administration of the merger doctrine to conclude that it
is best determined at the close of evidence upon an examination of all the
circumstances.213
The battle over when to apply the merger doctrine is most readily apparent
in Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., in which the Second Circuit
struck down a district court’s ruling because it applied the merger doctrine too
early in its analysis, before it contemplated the issue of “substantial similarity”
in the infringement prong.214 In Hart, the creator of a line of fish mannequins
used to display fish skin sued competitor Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co. for
making identical copies of its mannequins.215 The district court dismissed the
copyright infringement claim because the claimant’s fish mannequins had “no
meaningful detail . . . that is not commanded by the idea of a realistic fish,”
207 See 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082
(9th Cir. 2000) (also noting Nimmer’s stance).
208 See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 701–02.
209 Id. at 702. Kregos went through the necessary steps to “register[] his form with the Copyright Office
and obtain[] a copyright.” See id.
210 Id.
211 See id. at 707.
212 Id. at 705.
213 See id.; see also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the utility of applying merger to filter unprotectable elements in the infringement stage).
214 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996).
215 Id. at 321.
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and thus it held that the fish “‘exemplif[ied] the merger of idea and expression’
and were not copyrightable.”216
Second Circuit Judge Calabresi disagreed with that decision, arguing that
the district court applied the merger doctrine too early.217 While recognizing
that merger is not equivalent to the question of infringement, the court
pronounced its “strong preference” toward Nimmer’s approach, ratified in
Kregos.218 Judge Calabresi elaborated, “For in essence, the merger inquiry asks
whether all realistic fish mannequins, no matter how artistic they might be, will
necessarily be ‘substantially similar.’ And only if this is so, is there no unique
expression to protect under the copyright laws.”219
Judge Calabresi’s language treats merger more as a factual dispute rather
than a legal dispute.220 However, the learned judge made useful observations
concerning instances when merger is obvious at the onset:
It is true that Kregos did not categorically forbid district courts from
reaching merger questions before hearing evidence about substantial
similarity. There may be highly unusual cases in which virtually all
of an idea’s possible expressions are before a district court at the
copyrightability stage. In such rare cases it may perhaps be possible
to determine the merger issue while deciding whether a given
expression is copyrightable. But we agree with Kregos that this is
very unlikely and therefore adhere to our strong preference that the
question be decided only after all the evidence of substantial
similarity is before the court.221

According to Judge Calabresi, the realization that merger is applicable in a
given case is such a “sweeping conclusion” that it can only be realistically
reached after a full examination of the record, after substantial similarity has
been determined, as an affirmative defense.222 Ultimately, the court remanded
the case back to the district court to determine whether infringement had
occurred.223

216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 322.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 323.
See id.

NORTHOVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

1394

5/27/2016 10:17 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1363

The most recent precedent concerning the merger doctrine came in Oracle
America v. Google.224 In that case, Oracle sued Google for patent and
copyright infringement of thirty-seven packages of computer source code
known as application programming interfaces (APIs).225 Oracle’s predecessor,
Sun Microsystems, developed the Java APIs as a platform “to relieve
programmers from the burden of writing different versions of their computer
programs for different operating systems or devices.”226 Oracle holds
copyrights for 166 APIs that allow third-party programmers to use pre-written
code “shortcuts,” alleviating the programmers’ need to write entirely new code
from scratch.227
Google copied code verbatim from thirty-seven Java APIs and inserted that
code into parts of Android software.228 Google argued it did so because
programmers who were familiar with Java would want to find the same set of
thirty-seven functionalities called by the same names in the new Android
operating system as they would find in Java.229 Oracle filed suit in the
Northern District of California and Google alleged multiple defenses, one of
which argued that the idea behind the disputed APIs had merged with the
expression, rendering them uncopyrightable.230 The jury returned a verdict
concerning the infringement analysis, indicating that Google had infringed, but
the jury could not reach a conclusion as to Google’s fair use defense.231
However, the district judge, ruling on the issue of copyrightability, concluded
that the merger doctrine applies to Oracle’s APIs, rendering them
uncopyrightable as a matter of law.232
On appeal, Judge O’Malley, writing for the Federal Circuit, indicated that
the lower court erred when applying the merger doctrine.233 First, the court
argued that the district court erred by applying the merger doctrine to the
copyrightability stage, claiming that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, while questions
regarding originality are considered questions of copyrightability, concepts of
merger and scènes à faire are affirmative defenses to claims of
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
See id. at 1347.
Id. at 1347–48.
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1350–51.
Id. at 1350.
See id. at 1359–1360.
See id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1360–61.
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infringement.”234 Second, the court noted in dicta that because there were
multiple ways of expressing the same idea in code at the time Sun
Microsystems originally authored the APIs, the merger doctrine did not
apply.235 In dicta, Judge O’Malley proclaimed that “the district court erred in
focusing its merger analysis on the options available to Google at the time of
copying”; instead the scope of protectable subject matter is “to be evaluated at
the time of [the claimant’s] creation [rather than] the time of infringement.”236
This decision sparked discontent among programmers who fear that the
ruling in Oracle v. Google will have sweeping, negative implications on
software tech start-up companies.237 Some commentators have indicated that
this decision will suffocate small tech companies with a flood of litigation on
one hand or high licensing premiums on the other.238
The reasoning utilized by this line of cases has been heavily criticized,
most famously by Judge Sweet in his celebrated dissenting opinion in Kregos.
By framing the debate on the merger doctrine in the context of § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, Judge Sweet reasoned that the merger inquiry should take place
during the copyrightability analysis.239 Here the learned judge criticized
Nimmer’s approach because it requires that a reviewing court hold that the
“two works in question are not ‘substantially similar,’ even where they are in
fact identical, a result which [he] view[s] as a not useful variety of
doublespeak.”240 Besides this semantic confusion, Judge Sweet’s main concern
with Nimmer’s approach is the “erroneous conclusion” that merger should be

234 Id. at 1358. Here, Judge O’Malley was restricted to applying Ninth Circuit law because “on subjects
not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit, the court applies the law which would be applied by the
regional circuit.” Id. at 1353 (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)).
235 Id. at 1360. The court noted that Sun originally had “unlimited options as to the selection and
arrangement of the 7000 lines Google copied.” Id. at 1361 (quoting Opening Brief and Addendum of PlaintiffAppellant at 50, Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (No. 2013-1021), 2013 WL 518611, at *49).
236 Id. at 1361.
237 See, e.g., Russell Brandom, Federal Court Overturns Google v. Oracle Decision, Setting Disastrous
Precedent, VERGE (May 9, 2014, 1:53 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/9/5699958/federal-courtoverturns-google-v-oracle; Terry Hart, Federal Circuit Releases Decision in Oracle v. Google, COPYHYPE
(May 12, 2014), http://www.copyhype.com/2014/05/federal-circuit-releases-decision-in-oracle-v-google/.
238 See Corynne McSherry, Dangerous Decision in Oracle v. Google: Federal Circuit Reverses Sensible
Lower Court Ruling on APIs, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/
dangerous-ruling-oracle-v-google-federal-circuit-reverses-sensible-lower-court.
239 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
240 Id.
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relegated to merely explaining instances of “unintentional similarity.”241
Although Judge Sweet recognized the practical argument for a fully developed
record made by the majority,242 he concluded that judicial convenience cannot
offset the congressional intent behind § 102(b).243 Under Judge Sweet’s view,
evidence that the defendant actually copied a merged expression is irrelevant
because, as a matter of copyrightability, that merged expression is precluded
from private ownership and reverts to the public domain.244
This debate is not mere academic pedagogy; at stake here are hefty
litigation costs and the allocation of the burden of proof at trial.245 If the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits’ copyrightability approach is applied, the claimant bears
the burden to show that merger has not prevented her expression from being
copyrighted.246 Additionally, this approach advocates that a finding of merger
result in a dismissal during pretrial litigation, which helps secure a “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination.”247 However, if the Second and Ninth
Circuits prevail, then the burden of proof is placed on the alleged infringer as
an affirmative defense to be raised at the end of a trial.248 Due to the rise of
predatory copyright enforcement firms,249 special consideration should be
given to the disparity of power and resources in infringement lawsuits.250 The
advent of these “copyright trolls” threatens to chill free speech and the ability
of future authors to create derivative works.251
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Id. at 716.
See id.
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 See Matthew J. Faust, Comment, What Do We Do With a Doctrine Like Merger? A Look at the
Imminent Collision of the DMCA and Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 131, 133
(2008).
246 See Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 492–96 (7th Cir. 2011).
247 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (discussing the scope and purpose).
248 See NIMMER, supra note 204, §13.03(B)(3) n.166 (“The Register of Copyrights will not know about
the presence or absence of constraints that limit ways to express an idea. The burden of showing such
constraints should be left to the alleged infringer. Accordingly, . . . the relationship between ‘idea’ and
‘expression’ will not be considered on the issue of copyrightability, but will be deferred to the discussion of
infringement.” (ellipsis in original) (quoting NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1409, at 9 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 6, 1989))).
249 See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 55
(2014).
250 Cf. Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from
Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 771 (1981).
251 See Greenberg, supra note 249, at 55–56.
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B. Recognizing the Many Faces of the Merger Doctrine: A Pragmatic
Solution to the Circuit Split
Upon review of the circuit split, one can see how the different approaches
stem from deep-rooted interpretive differences concerning the scope and
purpose of the merger doctrine. The copyrightability approach advocated by
Veeck appears most useful when analyzing whether there is logically only one
way to express an idea.252 By emphasizing the language of § 102(b) and
rhetoric of Baker v. Selden, the copyrightability approach causes divestment of
the author’s exclusive right if the claimant cannot show some evidence that
there is more than one conceivable way to express the underlying idea;
evidence that the defendant actually copied is irrelevant.253 This view frames
merger as a matter of law, a theoretical question with a low evidentiary burden,
which is best suited to be argued at a pretrial motion for summary judgment.254
The affirmative defense approach championed by Kregos appears most
useful when analyzing whether merger applies to a finite set of expressions.255
This is a matter of degree, which is clearly a factual dispute that is best raised
at the final stages of an infringement suit after the reviewing judge has
examined the entire record.256 This inquiry may address extrinsic factors, such
as technology, culture, and the market, that limit the means of expressing an
idea.257 As a separate matter, because merger doctrine is most easily
determined at the end of trial, the Kregos approach constructs merger as
merely an affirmative defense that excuses a particular showing of substantial
similarity, absent evidence of actual copying.258
To be clear, it seems that the circuit split over the merger doctrine actually
illuminates different types of merger. In this vein of thought, Professor Patry
252 293 F.3d 791, 801 (5th Cir. 2002); see Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d
1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990).
253 See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
254 See Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 2011).
255 See 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:46.
256 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (defining merger
as barring copyright protection to patentable processes by examining “particular facts of each case” (quoting
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989))).
257 See Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding merger
requires an examination into the market practices of taxidermists, which is best examined in the context of the
alleged infringement).
258 Rogers, supra note 170, at 175. This view seems to conclude that the affirmative defense approach is
necessary for developing the trial record, when in fact it is merely sufficient. Other courts contemplating issues
of merger have achieved Nimmer’s goal of a fully developed trial record without requiring the defendant to
litigate a costly affirmative defense. See note 271 and accompanying text.
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reasons that, if the merger doctrine is kept at all, it should be split into two
different questions, applied at separate stages of the infringement suit.259 First,
if there is only one conceivable way to express an idea, then this is a matter of
originality and prevents copyrightability. For the purpose of easy analysis, this
Comment calls these cases instances of “theoretical merger.” Second, if there
is a limited pool of expressions, then the inquiry must consider the degree to
which the claimant’s copyright monopolizes the idea.260 This Comment calls
this second category “actual merger.” Patry argues that this kind of merger
affects the scope of copyright protection.261
In light of the expansion of the originality requirement under Feist, Patry’s
recommendations come into better focus.262 If theoretical merger applies,
because there is only one conceivable way to express an idea, then the plaintiff
will necessarily fail to show that her work contains a “modicum of creativity”
under Feist, preventing copyrightability of the plaintiff’s work.263 According to
Patry, for instances of actual merger, “[w]here there are choices regarding the
protectable content or design of a work, the court should focus not on
copyrightability but instead on the scope of protection, an inquiry that occurs at
the infringement stage, where the trier of fact will have the broadest
evidentiary basis possible.”264 Even though actual merger analysis is best
asserted during the infringement stage, Patry argues that it should not be
constructed as an affirmative defense. Instead, the burden of production should
be imposed on the plaintiff and a finding of merger should affect the scope of
her copyright.265
The Sixth Circuit recognized that different types of merger analysis exist in
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components Inc. but failed to
delineate precisely how theoretical merger and actual merger function

259 See 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:47. Patry actually argues that the merger doctrine should be
discontinued because of the confusion it has caused. Id. Instead, the same inquiry should be called different
names: originality and infringement. Id. This however is merely a disagreement over nomenclature.
260 Id.
261 See id. at § 4:46.
262 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
263 See 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:47; cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 340 (“Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” (citation omitted)).
264 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:46.
265 See id. § 4:46.
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doctrinally.266 Following in the spirit of Patry and Lexmark, this Comment
proposes the following solution to the circuit split.
First, the question of theoretical merger—which asks, Is there only one
conceivable way to express the underlying idea?—should take place during the
copyrightability stage when addressing the issue of originality.267 If the
plaintiff meets his burden by showing that there are at least two ways of
expressing the underlying idea, the court may move to the infringement stage,
so long as the other requirements of copyrightability are also met.268
Second, recognizing the pragmatism embodied in Nimmer’s approach, the
question of actual merger—which asks, Is there is a limited pool of expressions
caused by real-world constraints?—should take place at the close of all
arguments concerning infringement, after the reviewing judge has fully
examined the record.269 If this question is answered affirmatively, the
reviewing judge must consider the degree to which the plaintiff’s copyright, in
its actual effect, monopolizes an idea.270
Finally, although it is best analyzed at the end of trial, actual merger should
not be considered an affirmative defense that merely excuses the defendant’s
particular conduct.271 The plain language meaning of § 102(b) indicates that a
finding of merger should render actual copying permissible; this statutory
allowance cannot be overlooked merely for efficiency.272 Thus, any finding of
merger should affect the scope of copyrightability and evidence of actual
copying by the defendant should not be relevant.273 By splitting the merger
266

387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 2004).
See 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:47 (“[P]laintiff’s work should first be examined for copyrightability,
beginning with identification of the work’s idea. In the rare instance where there is only one way to express the
idea of the work, the work is not original.”); cf. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 801
(5th Cir. 2002); Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1464 (5th Cir. 1990).
268 Cf. Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 499 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the plaintiff’s failure to support his
argument that there is more than one way of expressing the underlying idea).
269 See Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996).
270 See id.
271 See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 716 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:46 (“[D]espite a few cases holding that merger is an
affirmative defense, it is not; merger is merely a denial that defendant has copied protectible material.”). This
is the approach taken by the 10th Circuit when addressing issues of actual merger, applying the doctrine during
the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test during the infringement stage, which keeps the burden of
production with the Plaintiff. See, e.g., Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir.
2014); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993) (calling merger an “additional filtration doctrine[]”).
272 See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 716 (Sweet, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273 See id.
267
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analysis into actual and theoretical questions, both of which impact the
claimant’s exclusive right, the view advocated here respects the statutory
language of § 102(b) by allowing for the free flow of ideas while solving the
administrative concerns that Nimmer highlights.274 The Hart court reluctantly
recognized the existence of what this Comment calls theoretical merger, but
underestimated its prevalence in copyright litigation and deemed this approach
unnecessary.275
By expounding upon Patry’s argument, the legal recommendations made
above work to disentangle some of the doctrinal confusion concerning merger.
However, taken alone, the power of this argument is merely descriptive; it
reconciles the split and establishes better “fit” between the circuits. To
strengthen these legal recommendations and provide them normative force, the
next Part examines how a contextualist Lockean theory of copyright would
resolve the split, finding results that endorse the legal solution this Comment
advocates.
C. Lockean Copyright Theory Applied to the Merger Doctrine—Violation of
Natural Law and Reversion to the Commons or Diminution of Right
As explained above, the merger doctrine bars copyright protection to an
expression that would otherwise confer a monopoly over an idea.276 Because
ideas are communal resources that cannot be appropriated without violating the
“enough and as good” proviso,277 the merger doctrine can be viewed as a
means of expunging the copyright owner’s duty to leave “enough and as good”
for others.278 Thus, this Comment proposes that if the merger doctrine applies
to a particular expression, then the “enough and as good” proviso is violated
and the copyright holder’s exclusive right is divested or diminished in scope,
allowing others to use the merged expression free from infringement
liability.279 Hughes’s interpretation, which argues that an otherwise ownable
expression becomes “depropertized” upon a violation of natural law, suggests

274

See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See Hart, 86 F.3d at 322 (calling such instances “rare”). Perhaps this is because in general “the
copyrightability of a work as a whole . . . is less frequently contested.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 538 (6th Cir. 2004).
276 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967).
277 See Horowitz, supra note 88, at 222.
278 See Drassinower, supra note 157, at 5 (recognizing merger and other fairness doctrines that limit the
author’s entitlement as compatible with Lockean “self-limiting” rights).
279 See Hughes, supra note 89, at 319.
275
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that a finding of merger should affect copyrightability.280 Furthermore, because
a violation of the “enough and as good” proviso causes reversion of a privately
held expression to the public domain or diminution in the scope of the
protection, evidence of actual copying should be irrelevant to a finding of
merger under this Lockean copyright theory.281 Because ideas are akin to
communal resources necessary to sustain society, one would expect for merged
expressions that monopolize ideas to be widely “copied” because of their
centrality to life as a shared vital resource.282
Like the personal duty prescribed by the “enough and as good” proviso,
compliance with the merger doctrine should be considered a duty that rests
with the copyright owner.283 However, it may be unfair to place all burdens on
the claimant to show that complex instances of merger do not apply; how is a
private litigant meant to arrive at the “sweeping conclusion” of whether actual
merger exists?284 Also, it may also be unrealistic to expect a judge to make
sound decisions without examining all the circumstances.285 To better grapple
with this question of equity and efficiency, a further examination of Locke’s
goal of minimizing the transaction costs of property ownership is needed.
1. Transaction Costs as Justification for State-Funded Arbitration
The portrayal of the state of nature as a stagnant concept that presupposes
Garden-of-Eden-like abundance is a misrepresentation; Locke describes the
state of nature in terms of an evolving narrative, depicting the formation and
progression of human society.286 The state of nature first given to all of
humanity in common was truly a world of bounty.287 During this time of
280

See id. at 319–20.
See id.
282 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
283 Compare TULLY, supra note 33, at 88 (“enough and as good” proviso burdens property owner), with
2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:47 (merger doctrine burdens copyright owner).
284 Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1996).
285 Id.
286 For an argument describing Locke’s state of nature as a factual description of early human society, see
generally LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). Viewing Locke’s state of nature as a narrative
story does not require accepting Strauss’ proposal; the state of nature may just be a thought experiment. Cf.
Carl J. Circo, Does Sustainability Require a New Theory of Property Rights?, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 91, 107
(2009) (describing Locke’s depiction of the state of nature as an eloquent story). If Locke’s state of nature is
considered a thought experiment, it must not be conflated with the static type of thought experiment espoused
by modern social contractarians. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971) (describing the
original position as appealing to a “higher level of abstraction” than the compact theory utilized by John
Locke).
287 See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 19.
281
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abundance, a laborer could unilaterally appropriate property without much
concern for violating the “enough and as good” proviso because “he that leaves
as much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all.”288 The
moral calculus imposed on property owners by the “enough and as good”
proviso in the “first ages of the world” was a simple task,289 judged by an
objective standard grounded in reason.290 Property owners held executive
powers to act as judges of their own conduct and to settle disputes with
others.291
However, this utopia did not last. Locke recognizes that “the increase of
people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce.”292 While the
invention of fiat money made the spoilage restriction less of an issue because
value could be stored in non-spoiling gold or silver, the “enough and as good”
proviso was more difficult to expunge under conditions of scarcity.293 As a
practical matter, Locke admits that his labor theory of acquisition, during times
of scarcity, may lead to overlapping property claims that cause “confusion and
disorder.”294 Locke argues that the remedy for such “inconveniencies” is the
development of civil government and state-funded arbitration.295
Most scholarship pertaining to Locke’s social compact theory grounds the
justification for leaving the state of scarcity and establishing civil government
on innate flaws in human nature; because individuals are greedy and
self-interested, they are not able to adjudicate claims fairly.296 With “no

288

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22. During this primeval era, “men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their
company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in.” Id.
290 See Helga Varden, The Lockean ‘Enough-and-as-Good’ Proviso: An Internal Critique, 9 J. MORAL
PHIL. 410, 442 (2012) (arguing that individually enforceable property rights in the state of nature are possible,
only if its inhabitants maintain a “natural executive right” to auto-adjudicate property disputes, which requires
a reading of the “enough and as good” proviso as an objective standard).
291 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 12.
292 Id. at 27.
293 See, e.g., DOUGLAS JOHN CASSON, LIBERATING JUDGMENT: FANATICS, SKEPTICS, AND JOHN LOCKE’S
POLITICS OF PROBABILITY 234 (2011) (“Before money, judgments based on need and use were sufficient to
conduct one’s life in accordance with natural law. With the introduction of money, this direct experiential
understanding is obscured. And this change brings about a crisis of probable judgment.”); JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 172 (1988).
294 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 12.
295 Id.
296 See MACPHERSON, supra note 35, at 239 (“For Locke, like Hobbes, held that men are moved primarily
by appetite . . . .”). There is certainly some truth in this statement. See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 13.
289
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common superior on earth to appeal to for relief,” the civility of the state of
nature necessarily spirals into a state of war.297
Rather than appeal to innate deficiencies in human nature, this Comment
argues that the complicated administration of rights and duties under
conditions of scarcity is too impractical for individuals to self-adjudicate.298 In
this light, the “inconveniencies” Locke describes could be considered high
transaction costs.299 Because the duty to leave “enough and as good” is
difficult to determine under conditions of scarcity, property disputes
necessarily arise; to mitigate this instability, property owners are willing to
forgo absolute authority over their property in exchange for a neutral arbiter to
apply “settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties.”300 Thus,
property owners consent to the creation of the state in order to decrease the
transaction costs of adjudicating complicated disputes under conditions of
scarcity.301
Locke famously proclaims that “by compact and agreement, [private
individuals] settled the property which labour and industry began.”302 The
state, vested with authority by a written constitution and the consent of the
citizenry, is empowered with the ability to regulate property.303 However,
according to Locke, the move to civil government does not trump natural
law.304 Once society is created, “the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to
297

SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 15.
While the law of nature is intelligible to all rational people, Locke recognizes that, under conditions of
scarcity, people may be “ignorant for want of study of it.” SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 66.
299 See Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective
Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1185–86 (2008).
300 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 46–47. The Supreme Court has long recognized Locke’s
justification for state authority and blind administration of law by a neutral arbiter. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 767 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity case); Robertson v. United States ex rel.
Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 276 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
301 JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY 79 n.23 (1994) (“By organizing a legal order . . .
decision-making costs are reduced because, instead of achieving unanimous consent, which requires numerous
bilateral agreements, one social contract is substituted . . . .” (citing RONALD COASE, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM
(1937))).
302 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 27–28.
303 See WALDRON, supra note 293, at 210 (“Locke appears to connect the age of plenty with the lack of
any need for consent to appropriate and the age of money and scarcity with a suggestion that now, after all,
property is based on consent.”). This emphasis on consent has led some scholars to conclude that in Locke’s
civil society, all property is contingent on whatever the polity decides. See, e.g., TULLY, supra note 33, at 164–
70.
304 See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 12 (“[M]unicipal laws of countries . . . are only so far right,
as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.”); John Locke,
Essays on the Law of Nature, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 171, 179 (Paul E.
298
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all men, legislators as well as others.”305 Thus, the move to civil society did
not substantively change natural law duties; it merely shifted procedural
burdens to the state.306
By examining the state of nature as an evolving narrative, one can see how
the burden to expunge the “enough and as good” proviso can fluctuate based
on transaction costs.307 In the state of abundance, the “enough and as good”
proviso was simple to meet; it was a theoretical question that could be deduced
from reason.308 In the state of scarcity, the “enough and as good” proviso was
nearly impossible to determine as a private individual; it was a factual question
that required an expansive examination of circumstances in the market and
environment.309 Although individual property owners always retain a duty
under the “enough and as good” proviso, because the state was created to
alleviate the high transaction costs of property ownership, a judicial magistrate
should also carry a burden to resolve complex property disputes with the aim
of promoting efficiency and equity.310
2. Structuring Infringement Litigation with Locke’s Dual Concern for
Efficiency and Equity
When this Lockean framework for allocating duties based on relative
transaction costs is applied to the circuit split on the merger doctrine, it yields a
surprising symmetry. As a default rule, because the duty to leave “enough and
as good” is always imposed on property owners as a condition precedent to
acquisition,311 an author seeking copyright protection in court is best situated
to carry the legal burden to prove that merger does not apply.312 However, the
copyright owner may not be able to anticipate, or even fully comprehend, how
changes in technology, governmental regulation, or common culture will cause
Sigmund ed., 2005) (“[The law of nature] is a fixed and permanent rule of morals which reason itself
pronounces, and which persists, being a fact so firmly rooted in the soil of human nature.” (alteration in
original)).
305 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 70–71. Thus in civil society, both public policy and private
conduct is governed by natural law; individuals retain the duties imposed by the limiting provisos. See id.
306 The Supreme Court has recognized Locke’s social compact theory as shifting adjudicatory burdens to
a neutral judicial magistrate. See Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 283 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
307 See CASSON, supra note 293, at 234.
308 See MERGES, supra note 5, at 50–51.
309 See id.
310 See infra Part IV.C.2.
311 See TULLY, supra note 33, at 165.
312 Cf. Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 504 (7th Cir. 2011).
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actual merger of an otherwise copyrightable expression. Situations like these
require a full examination of the record with the analytical sophistication of a
learned judge.313
Thus, like moral actors situated in Locke’s initial state of abundance,
copyright owners should carry the burden to prove, as an objective standard
based on reason and logic, that theoretical merger has not rendered their
expression uncopyrightable. This embodies the logic in Veeck, Kern River, and
other “rare cases” reluctantly recognized by the Hart court.314 On the other
hand, similar to the complex moral calculus of the “enough and as good”
proviso under conditions of scarcity, issues of actual merger are best resolved
by a judicial magistrate when the litigation record is fully developed.315 This
respects the concern for prudent judicial administration voiced by Nimmer and
the Hart and Kregos courts.316
While these recommendations on the merger doctrine find textual support
from Locke’s ruminations on transaction costs, admittedly, the above argument
requires an examination of the mischief Locke sought to remedy: namely,
royal entitlements and the monopolization of communal resources, both of
which inhibit economic growth.317 Locke argues that laws should be
formulated to “secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of
mankind, against the oppression of power and the narrowness of party.”318 In
addition to Locke’s theoretical writings, in his political advocacy Locke
fervently criticized unfair monopolization of resources granted by royal decree
and descent.319 Because the merger doctrine functions to prevent the
monopolization of ideas, a purposivist reading of Locke’s canon prescribes an
expansive reading of the merger doctrine that is cognizant of the disparity of

313

Cf. Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1996).
See supra Part IV.A.1.
315 Even though an issue of actual merger must be conducted at the close of all evidence, this Comment
argues that it should not be considered an affirmative defense. See 2 PATRY, supra note 187, § 4:46. The
Lockean theory of copyright proposed here would “depropertize” any private property that is in violation of
natural law. See Hughes, supra note 89, at 320.
316 See supra Part IV.A.2.
317 See SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 26.
318 Id.
319 TULLY, supra note 33, at 134. Locke’s labor theory of acquisition served as a theoretical tool against
feudal entitlement to land based on the inheritance rules of primogeniture and entail. See Huston, supra note
56, at 1080.
314
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power in copyright infringement suits and is constructed to ensure fair
competition absent of monopolistic entitlement.320
Large media outlets, seeking to monopolize distribution and use rights by
filing frivolous infringement suits in conjunction with copyright troll
enforcement firms, impose high transaction costs on independent authors and
artists, inhibiting the creation of future works.321 Many Lockean scholars argue
that the transaction costs imposed by monopolistic ownership can be buttressed
by expanding protection of the commons.322 Applying the merger doctrine in
both stages of the infringement analysis provides a more robust protection of
the public domain that coincides with Locke’s concern for intellectual progress
and fair competition.323 Procedurally, the legal solution proposed here
mitigates the costs of frivolous infringement suits meant to chill fair
competition; defendants are granted relief through expedited dismissals upon a
finding of theoretical merger.324 Furthermore, ratifying these legal
recommendation may deter some litigious plaintiffs, like copyright trolls, from
filing excessive infringement claims because a positive finding of merger will
cause a diminution in the scope of the plaintiff’s copyright protection.
Although the recommendations made in this Comment expand the merger
doctrine, rational economic copyright holders need not complain. According to
the Coase theorem, “in a world with zero transaction costs, initial rights
allocations are unimportant; they will be transferred to their highest value use
through private bargains.”325 This proposition instructs jurists to be mindful of
transaction costs and construct standing legal rules that put property owners on
notice of well-defined rights and obligations.326 Locke’s natural rights
paradigm has been praised by legal scholars as a means of constructing clear
legal rules,327 while the role of transaction cost reduction in his compact theory
320

See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the
Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2003, at 75, 84 (2003) (describing Locke’s
anti-monopolist sentiments).
321 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004); Greenberg, supra note 249, at 84.
322 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS,
STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 40–44 (2008) (discussing “the tragedy of the anticommons”).
323 See Locke, Memorandum on the Licensing Act of 1662, supra note 70, at 374–88.
324 Cf. Peckham, supra note 250, at 771 (“[P]retrial procedures streamline litigation and thereby cut costs
and help equalize the financial positions of the parties.”).
325 Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655,
2656 (1994).
326 See id. at 2656–57.
327 See Cloud, supra note 85, at 67.
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reveals the societal importance of maintaining “settled standing rules.”328
Rules delineated from Locke’s canon offer more efficient, equitable, and
predictable legal outcomes when compared to the utilitarian alternatives that
currently predominate copyright law.329
CONCLUSION
By attempting to stretch Lockean doctrine to comport with the libertarian
maxim of absolute, unencumbered property rights, Moore and MacPherson
have relegated Locke’s vibrant theory to pure dogmatism that has no practical
utility for lawyers and policymakers because the possessive individualist
interpretation requires radical paradigmatic shifts that will not likely come to
fruition.330 A contextualist reading of Locke’s entire canon reveals a more
pragmatic approach that prescribes steps towards piecemeal reform within
well-established legal doctrines.331 This contextualist reading of Locke
reclaims his theory, for practitioners, as a viable advocacy tool and, for judges,
as a powerful means of dispensing a theory of justice that comports with
foundational principles embedded within the Constitution.332
Not only is the contextualist reading of Lockean copyright theory capable
of handling complex issues in copyright law, but upon review it also appears to
accurately describe the process of individual authorship as mixing one’s own
intellectual labor with ideas kept free in the public domain, forming
copyrightable material.333 Unlike Locke’s theory of tangible property, which is
less applicable today because no land remains in common, the public domain
may be the one commons left in which paradigmatic Lockean labor-based
acquisitions can occur.334
This Comment highlights the merger doctrine circuit split and suggests that
a contextualist reading of Lockean copyright theory yields a solution.
Contextualist copyright Lockeans argue that ideas are communal resources that
may be freely used to create copyrightable expressions; any private

328

SECOND TREATISE, supra note 26, at 46–47.
See MERGES, supra note 5, at 3–7.
330 See Moore, supra note 11, at 77 (arguing that ideas should be copyrightable).
331 See supra Part III.B.
332 See supra Part III.B.
333 See MERGES, supra note 5, at 32.
334 Id. (“Fresh appropriation from a background of unowned or widely shared material is much more
common today in the world of IP than in the world of tangible assets.”).
329
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appropriation of an idea violates the “enough and as good” proviso.335 In this
light, because the merger doctrine bars copyright protection of an expression
that effectively monopolizes an idea, this Comment considers the claimant’s
burden under the merger doctrine as a requirement dictated by the “enough and
as good” proviso.336
Expanding on the work of other contextualist Lockean copyright theorists,
this Comment argues that duties faced by moral actors in Locke’s evolving
state of nature can be used to allocate burdens of proof in copyright
infringement cases. Simple issues like theoretical merger should be asserted
during the copyrightability stage, while complex issues are left for the
infringement stage, where the reviewing judge has the benefit of a developed
case record.337 A Lockean rights paradigm allows judges to structure copyright
litigation by allocating burdens of proof at trial based on the scope of a moral
actor’s duty in Locke’s evolving state of nature.338 Clear rules that define
burdens of proof would streamline the litigation process, and with these clearer
expectations, litigants may be induced to settle their disputes.339
Besides resolving problems of inefficiency, Locke’s theory prescribes that
all issues of merger should affect the copyrightability of the claimant’s
work.340 Because violations of the “enough and as good” proviso cause
divestment of exclusive ownership, and if the prohibition against merged
expressions is constructed to enforce this duty, then a finding of merger will
cause reversion of the work to the intellectual commons or a diminution in the
scope of its protection.341
It is evident that a Lockean rights-based paradigm lends itself to easier
judicial administration when compared to the confusing utilitarian balancing
tests that prevail throughout contemporary copyright law.342 In contrast to the
uncertainty created by utilitarian balancing tests in copyright law,343 Lockean
335

Horowitz, supra note 115, at 222.
See supra Part IV.C.
337 See supra Part IV.C.1.
338 See supra Part IV.C.2.
339 See Peckham, supra note 250, at 772–73.
340 Cf. Hughes, supra note 89, at 316.
341 See id.
342 See supra Part III.A.
343 MERGES, supra note 5, at 3 (“The sheer practical difficulty of measuring or approximating all the
variables involved means that the utilitarian program will always be at best aspirational. . . . Maximizing
utility . . . is not a serviceable first-order principle of the IP system. It is just not what IP is really all about at
the deepest level.”).
336

NORTHOVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

5/27/2016 10:17 AM

“ENOUGH AND AS GOOD” IN THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS

1409

rights lend themselves to judicial construction of bright-line rules but achieve
the same utilitarian outcomes.344 Besides these administrative advantages,
adopting Lockean justifications in copyright law may yield other positive
benefits for society.345
It seems clear that Locke contemplated a labor theory of acquisition for
intellectual objects. Describing his own work as a philosopher, Locke thought
himself “employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and
removing some of the rubbish which lies in the way to knowledge.”346 Here,
Locke’s imagery evokes an analogy between mental and physical labor that
supports copyright protection under the labor theory of acquisition. This
Comment advocates a contextualist reading of Locke’s canon that can be
applied to solve complex legal issues disputed in copyright law. While this
project may be theoretically cumbersome at the onset, reconciling abstract
philosophy with constitutional, statutory, and common law, the result will be
streamlined litigation and more certainty for copyright owners.
Locke’s writings influenced the first copyright act of England, which in
turn shaped early American copyright law.347 Lockean theory has lain dormant
in copyright jurisprudence for far too long. The legal recommendations
expressed above concerning the merger doctrine are but a small sample of the
usefulness of Lockean theory and rhetoric; indeed, more work remains. It is
time for legal theorists to remove the rubbish proliferated by partisan
misrepresentations of the Second Treatise and focus on piecemeal reform in
the spirit of Locke’s endeavor.

344

By using a Lockean fruit-of-labor justification for IP ownership that is structured to achieve utilitarian
outcomes, Professor Crowne argues that “much of the confusion . . . can be simplified and rationalized into a
coherent body of jurisprudence that is consistent with the underlying goals of the patent system.” Crowne,
supra note 97, at 763.
345 Many scholars have argued that the Lockean labor theory of value coincides with our most commonly
held moral intuitions. See, e.g., Circo, supra note 286, at 107. Perhaps adopting Lockean labor–deserts
justifications in intellectual property will provide copyright decisions an extra layer of legitimacy. Others have
argued that adopting Lockean rhetoric in copyright decisions may induce people to work harder. See Stewart
E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1249 (1996). Historically, the
Supreme Court has often evoked a labor–deserts rhetoric in IP cases. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 561 (1973) (“‘[W]ritings’ . . . may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”).
346 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 123, at 10.
347 See supra Part II.
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Locke once considered the vast tracts of unexplored America, full of wild
abundance, as the closest approximation to the state of nature that may have
ever existed.348 By maintaining a strict reading of § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act and upholding public use doctrines like merger, we preserve one of the last
and greatest commons left in America and enable Locke’s project to continue.
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